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Is Central Bank of Nigeria Pursuing
Preferential Development Finance?
Some Parametric and
Non-Parametric Evidence

Introduction

T

he developmental function of the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) is tangential to the achievement of
its core mandates of ensuring monetary and
price stability, maintaining external reserves to
safeguard the international value of the naira, and
ensuring sound and stable nancial system (when we
consider nancial system development as the ratio of
private sector credit to gross domestic product
(GDP), and the Bank's developmental function as
improving access to credit, among other forms of
nance). It also fosters its mandate of acting as
banker and economic and nancial adviser to the
government when, for instance, it supports public
policies by funding special purpose vehicles such as
the Nigerian Bulk Electricity Trading Plc., to meet
various government commitments.
By this function, the Bank is at liberty to intervene in the
nancial market by targeting micro, small and
medium enterprises (MSMEs) and large enterprises for
investment and production. This function is motivated
by several developmental imperatives. These
include, promoting inclusive growth and job creation;
economic diversication; reducing capacity
underutilisation; conserving and shoring up foreign
exchange reserves by curbing high import bills; and
enhancing the effectiveness of, and responsiveness
to, monetary and credit policy actions by attracting
and retaining more economic agents, such as
households and rms, in the formal nancial system.

Xavier-Itam A. Okon (Ph.D)
xaokon@cbn.gov.ng
Development Finance Department
Central Bank of Nigeria

Abstract
As encompassing as the development nance
interventions of the Central Bank of Nigeria are, there
appears to be a preference for the agricultural sector
and the manufacturing sub-sector. The study applied
the parametric ANOVA and the non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis Tests, to inferentially determine whether
this is, indeed, the case. Findings, however, indicate
that the intervention intensity is equal for all sectors,
implying the Bank adopts a holistic, rather than
preferential, approach to its development nance
practice. This strategically engenders, among others,
uniform development, inclusive growth and
economic diversication. The interventions should be
sustained and their coverage extended to other
crucial sub-sectors such as mining & quarrying and
education, given their strong potential for
employment generation, human capital
development and deepening of socio-economic
inclusiveness.

During the era of direct control or economic
regulation, the CBN adopted sectoral credit
allocation and interest rate administration as
monetary policy instruments to stimulate the
productive sectors of the economy, stem inationary
pressures, encourage investments and achieve
overriding policy objectives such as promoting the
ow of credit to the preferred sectors (Tule et. al. 2015;
Udeaja and Udoh, 2014; Ojong et al, 2014). The credit
allocation policy classied the economy into
preferred, less-preferred and unclassied sectors, with
specied minimum credit limits (Udeaja and Udoh,
2014; Ojong et al, 2014). The successes and failures of
these policies abound in the literature (CBN, 2016;
Ojong et al, 2014; CBN, 2011; Ajayi and Ojo, 2006).
Following economic liberalization and the advent of
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP),
'preferred sector' status of the productive sectors was
discontinued. According to Anyanwu (2010), the
enforced funding from the banks ceased, while the
market-determined interest rates tended to exclude
these sectors, especially agriculture, from the credit
market. Presently, the huge MSME funding gap
estimated at US$158.13 billion ( 48 trillion), low credit
to the private sector to GDP ratio of 17.63 per cent
(low nancial deepening), persistently low credit to

JEL Classication: E51, E58
Keywords: central bank; development nance;
monetary policy; intervention; preferential; preferred
sectors.
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SMEs of less than 1 per cent of total banks' loans and
advances, and the skewed sectoral credit distribution
of banks, all necessitated pragmatic intervention in
the market in favour of needy sectors (Bruhn et al,
2017; CBN, 2018a).

estate, public utilities, transport and communications,
nance and insurance, government, import and
domestic trade); and other sectors, with specied
minimum credit limits (Udeaja and Udoh, 2014; Ojong
et al, 2014). According to CBN (2016), the monetary
authorities deployed direct tools such as credit
ceilings and controls and administration of interest
and exchange rates, among others, to achieve price
stability and allocate nancial resources to preferred
sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing at
concessionary interest rates.

In the last ten years, CBN has aggressively intervened
by sustaining or introducing nancing programmes
and schemes that reduce credit rationing or offer
relatively low-interest and long-tenored nancing for
MSMEs. Given the frequent reference to agriculture
and manufacturing as the target candidates for
these interventions (CBN, 2018b; CBN, 2011). With the
large concentration of interventions directly targeting
both, it becomes interesting to determine whether,
knowingly or unknowingly, there is still a nancing
preference for them, or whether a holistic approach is
being adopted by the Bank. If a sector-preferential
policy is in place, the favoured sectors will dominate
the entire intervention basket or suite in terms of
intensity of nancing over time.

Ojo (1992) stated that the preferred sectors were to
receive 75 – 79 per cent of banks' loans and
advances. In the early 1980s, the cap on specic
banks' credit to the preferred sectors was pegged at
30 – 40 per cent of cumulative loans and advances,
but was trimmed down to 7 per cent by 1985 (Ajayi
and Ojo, 2006). Between 1981 and 1983, the policy
mandated commercial banks to utilise 56 per cent of
their total credit in funding the production sub-sectors
of the preferred sectors, namely agricultural
production, mining, manufacturing, agro-allied
industries and construction, while the services subsector was to receive 12 per cent (Soyibo and
Adekanye, 1992).

Establishing sectoral dominance, in this case, would
be synonymous with the application of statistical
inference methods. That is, testing the null hypothesis
of no difference in the mean intensity of intervention
by the CBN between the sectors of the economy over
time, against the alternative that there is. In other
words, the null hypothesis that there is no sectoral
preference in the CBN's development nance
function, against the alternative that such a
preferential policy based on sector exists. For
purposes of this study, intervention intensity is the
totality of nancing from the CBN, whether induced
by credit guarantee and other policy actions of the
Bank, or by direct funding (on-lending) through
participating nancial institutions (PFIs).

The policy prescribed permissible aggregate credit
expansion ceilings and selective credit controls to
encourage indigenous businesses, small-scale
enterprises and the rural areas (CBN, 2011). The
required minimum ratio of loans and advances of
commercial banks to indigenous entrepreneurs was
raised from 70 per cent in 1980 to 90 per cent in 1984.
Besides, by 1982, banks were to mandatorily lend not
less than 30 per cent of their rural deposits to their rural
customers. This ratio was increased to 40 per cent in
1985 (Ojo, 1992).

The paper proceeds as follows: Section two is the
literature review and conceptual issues, which
include sectoral credit allocation and preferred
sectors, administrative interest rates, credit to SMEs,
sectoral credit distribution of banks and overview of
CBN's development nance interventions. Section
three presents the methodology or analytical
procedure, while section four discusses the results,
ndings and implications. Section ve concludes the
study with recommendations.
2.0

Literature review and conceptual Issues

2.1

Sectoral Credit Allocation and Preferred
Sectors

With respect to merchant banks, the policy changed
the distribution of their assets portfolio with a view to
inducing long term lending. For instance, in 1980, a
minimum of 40 per cent of their credit was to be of
medium and long-term nature, while a maximum of
20 per cent was to be channelled to short term
projects. In 1985, the ratio of medium to long-term
credit was raised to 50 per cent (Ojo, 1992). Apart
from these banks, and in furtherance of the
preferential policy, development nance institutions
(DFIs) have been established by government with the
mandate to channel credit to specic sectors (CBN,
2000). These DFIs are the Bank of Agriculture (BOA) for
agriculture, Bank of Industry (BOI) for industry
(including manufacturing), Federal Mortgage Bank of
Nigeria (FMBN) for real estate, and the Nigerian
Export-Import Bank (NEXIM) for exports.

The sectoral credit allocation policy was a direct
monetary policy instrument adopted by the Bank in
the 1981-85 period (CBN, 2011). It classied the
economy into preferred (agriculture, solid minerals,
exports and manufacturing); less-preferred (real

According to Udeaja and Udoh (2014), agriculture
gained as its share of credit grew from 2.6 per cent in
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1975 to 10.8 per cent in 1985 even as its contribution to
GDP expanded from 20.6 per cent in 1980 to 32.7 per
cent in 1985. However, the controls were ineffective
because it was difcult to keep banks within the
stipulated targets. In this regard, Ikhide (1996) noted
that although 75 per cent of credit was supposed to
go to the preferred sectors, the commercial banks
achieved 69.1 per cent while the merchant banks
only achieved 62.8 per cent of their 79 per cent limit.
He concluded that both types of banks, it would
seem, extended more credit to the non-preferred
sectors during the period, with the merchant banks
faring worse. According to CBN (1996), the policy,
which was inconsistent with the principle of a
deregulated nancial sector, seemed to have made
some impact even though its prolonged use
engendered distortions and inefciencies.

directive to banks to lend to agriculture at 7 per cent
in 1984, whereas average savings deposit rate was 9.5
per cent (Ojong et al, 2014).
With the introduction of SAP in 1986, the Bank
implemented a series of nancial reforms to enhance
competition, reduce distortion in investment
decisions and evolve a sound and more efcient
nancial system. The major reforms were deregulation
of exchange and interest rates, removal of preferred
sector credit allocation and free entry into banking
business subject to fullment of several conditions
(Asekome and Aihie, 2014; Ogwuma, 1993; Ojo,
1993). Interest rate was deregulated in August 1987 as
part of the SAP package (Adofu and Alhassan, 2018).
Although there were was a slight policy reversal in
1994 with the pegging of deposit rates at 12 – 15 per
cent and the introduction of 21 per cent ceiling on
lending rates, exible interest rate regime was
resumed in October 1996 (Amassoma et al, 2011;
Okpara, 2010; Omole and Falokun, 1999).

The sector-specic credit allocation targets were
reduced to four sectors in 1986, and two in 1987. From
October 1996, all mandatory credit allocation
mechanisms were abolished (CBN(undated)).
However, the CBN (2010) alluded to the preferred
sectors concept when it endorsed complimentary
policies put in place, especially the revised guidelines
for loan loss provisioning for the “preferred sectors”
and the SME Credit Guarantee Scheme, among
others. While this may have been a reference to the
importance of the sectors in discourse, which
included agriculture and manufacturing, it left policy
analysts wondering if a policy reversal, akin to the
interest rate deregulation policy reversal in 1994, was
in the ofng.
2.2

2.3

Credit to SMEs and sectoral credit distribution
of banks 2009 – 2018

In the decade immediately following the 2007-2008
global nancial crisis, commercial banks' loans to
small-scale enterprises (or SMEs) as a proportion of
total credit to private sector, increased from 0.17 per
cent in 2009 to 0.26 per cent in 2018 (Figure 1). On the
basis of sub-periods, it averaged 0.15 per cent
between 2009 and 2013, rising to an average of 0.20
per cent in the 2014-2018 lustrum.

Administrative interest rates

The sectoral allocation of credit was accompanied
by a concessionary interest rate policy. The xed
interest rate regime was intended to provide cheap
credit to the preferred sectors of the economy,
including SMEs (CBN, 2003a, CBN, 2003b), and
encourage the upsurge of small-scale
industrialization which is a catalyst for economic
development (Udoka and Roland, 2012). The
concessionary rates were typically below the
minimum rediscount rate. They averaged about 7.25
per cent in 1978-85, which was outpaced by ination,
resulting in negative interest rates (Ojong et al, 2014).

Figure 1: Commercial banks' loans to small-scale
enterprises as a percentage of total credit
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 2018

The policy regime produced adverse consequences,
with nominal interest rates dropping to their lowest
before 1986 (CBN, 2016). According to the CBN, apart
from the xed interest rates trailing ination and
causing nancial disintermediation and misallocation
of resources, the policy objective of improving
investment and growth in the real sector was not
achieved. Eventually, the preferred sectors were
unable to access funding owing, partly, to the inability
of banks to mobilise sufcient loanable funds at the
concessionary interest rates, as exemplied by the

This sharply contrasted with the fact that, together
with micro enterprises, the small-scale enterprises (or
MSMEs) contributed about 48.5 per cent of national
income and about 7.3 per cent of exports (SMEDAN/
NBS, 2013). The realisation of the immense economic
importance of these enterprises that are denitely
under-funded by the banking system further provided
impetus for CBN's interventions in the MSME segment
in recent years.
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Relatedly, an examination of commercial banks' loans and advances by sector is even more revealing (Table
I). The analysis is similarly disaggregated into the two sub-periods as in the preceding discussion, but due to
dissimilarity in the sectoral classication scheme over both periods. Ostensibly a carry-over from the era of
sectoral credit allocation and preferred sector policy, the classication scheme for the 2009-2013 had
production, general commerce, services and others as the broad sectors. In this sub-period, the production
sector, comprising agriculture, manufacturing, mining and quarrying, and real estate and construction,
attracted 40.9 per cent of loans and its share of credit grew at a compounded growth rate of 9.2 per cent.
Services share was 20.9 per cent but with a decline of 1.9 per cent.
Table I: Analysis of Sectoral Distribution of Commercial Banks’ Loans and Advances
Period: 2009 – 2013

Sector
Production

Component sector

Agriculture, forestry and shery
Manufacturing
Mining and quarrying
Real estate and construction
General Commerce
Bills Discounted
Domestic Trade
Exports
Imports
Services
Public utilities
Transport and communications
Credit to nancial institutions
Others
Government
Personal and professional
Miscellaneous

Period: 2014 - 2018
Share Growth*
( per
( per
cent)
cent)
Sector
Sub-sector
40.9
9.2 Agriculture
2.8
26.2 Industry
12.6
4.4
Mining and quarrying
18.0
16.0
Manufacturing
7.5
-17.0
Oil and gas
10.7
-11.4
Power and energy
0
0 Construction
0
0 Trade/ General Commerce
0.5
-45.9 Government
10.2
-10.7 Services
20.5
-1.9
Real estate
Finance, insurance and capital
1.0
30.2
market
12.4
7.1
27.9
6.1
0
21.8

15.7
-28.4
3.9
19.5
0
0.6

Education
Oil and gas
Power and energy
Others

Share Growth*
( per
( per
cent)
cent)
3.4
3.8
36.7
10.9
0.1
-10.1
13.6
6.5
20.4
14.4
2.6
10.9
4.1
2.5
6.9
0.4
7.9
17.9
41.0
-1.6
4.8
6.7
6.1

8.0

0.5
8.0
1.7
19.8

-6.5
2.0
20.1
8.6

* Compound annual growth rate.
Source: Author’s compilation from Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 2018

In the 2014-2018 sub-period, following review of the
sectoral classication scheme to emphasis the nature
of production, the shares of agriculture, industry,
construction and services were 3.4 per cent, 36.7 per
cent, 4.1 per cent and 41.0 per cent respectively,
while the growth rates of banks' credit to these sectors
within the same sub-period were 3.8 per cent, 10.9 per
cent, 2.5 per cent and -1.6 per cent, respectively. In
summary, agriculture recorded the lowest share of
credit while services, although with the highest share,
registered the slowest growth, which was negative. It
is also noted that the oil and gas sub-sector attracted
the highest nancing within this time, at 28.4 per cent
of all credit, with manufacturing coming a distant
second with 13.6 per cent.

Understandably, commercial banks' preferences,
guided more by prot than other motive, appeared
not quite in sync with national priorities of, for
example, food security, job creation and promotion
of investments. Their pattern of nancing of
economic activities, characterised by high interest
rates and short-tenored loans, seemed to favour the
highly-lucrative but capital-intensive oil and gas subsector, thereby tending to promote growth without
inclusion. The CBN, obviously aware of the adverse
implications of this on macroeconomic policy
effectiveness and on other facets of national life
such as security of life and property, assumed a
proactive role through its development nance
interventions to address the observed lop-sidedness.

In this latter lustrum, these two sectors were driving real
economic growth and contributing signicantly to
national income. Agriculture consistently posted
positive growth even during the recession, averaging
3.6 per cent for the review period. Conversely,
services consistently captured more than half of gross
domestic product, with average growth of 2.56 per
cent. Credit to government ranked third overall,
setting aside the “others” in services.

2.3

Overview of CBN's Development Finance
Interventions 2009 - 2018

The CBN (2019a) believed the MSME funding gap of
about ₦48 trillion or US$158.13 billion reected the
risk-driven apathy of nancial institutions to lend to
these enterprises. This gap represented about 47.7
per cent of the MSME nancing gap of Sub-Saharan
Africa, and specically compared unfavourably
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with US$30.34 billion for South Africa and US$46.72
billion for Egypt, both in Africa, and US$21.45 billion for
Malaysia, an emerging market economy (Bruhn et al,
2017). This was despite the Bank's vigorous efforts,
especially in the 2014 – 2019 sub-period, to address
this challenge using a myriad of intervention policies
in form of programmes, schemes and institutions. This
paper focuses on the operative programmes and
schemes of the Bank from 2009 to 2018.

·
·
·
·

2.4.3

2.4.4

Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS);
Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme (CACS);
Anchor Borrowers' Programme (ABP);
Paddy Aggregation Scheme (PAS);
Accelerated Agricultural Development Scheme
(AADS); and
Interest Drawback Programme (IDP).

2.4.2

·

Real Sector Support Facility (RSSF);

·

RSSF using Differentiated Cash Reserve Ratio
(RSSF-DCRR or DCRR);

·

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Fund (MSMEDF);

·

National Food Security Programme (NFSP);

·

Export Development Facility (EDF);

·

Non-Oil Export Stimulation Facility (NESF);

·

Agri-business/ Small and Medium Enterprises
Investment Scheme (AGSMEIS); and

·

Youth Empowerment Development Programme
(YEDP).

To sustain momentum in the 2019 – 2024 term and
magnify previous successes in its development
nance policies, the CBN (2019b) reiterated its policy
thrust of working with banks to improve access to
credit for smallholder farmers, MSMEs, consumption
and real estate (mortgage), as well as, supporting
efforts at diversifying the economy through its
intervention programmes in agriculture and
manufacturing.

Agriculture Sector Interventions

These target the entire agricultural value chain and all
enterprise segments by size. A few of these target
specic commodities or value chain segments, e.g.
PAS, which is for rice millers. They include:

·

Multi-Sectoral or Cross-Sectoral Interventions

These interventions target a mix of sectors and subsectors, cutting across agriculture, industry
(manufacturing), services and trade. These include:

Since then, other intervention policies have been
introduced by the CBN either solely or collaboratively
with nancial institutions, but denitely inspired by it.
The interventions and their sectoral focus as espoused
by the respective policy guidelines are outlined
hereafter.

·
·
·
·
·

Services Sector Interventions

These interventions target services sector, especially
public utilities. These include:
· Power and Airline Intervention Fund (PAIF);
· Nigerian Bulk Electricity Trading - Payment
Assurance Facility (NBET-PAF);
· Shared Agent Network Expansion Facility (SANEF);
and
· Nigeria Electricity Market Stabilization Facility
(NEMSF).

The Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS),
which commenced operations in 1978, was jointly
established by the Federal Government and the Bank
to provide guarantees to banks that lend to the
agricultural sector. It continued operations in the
review period, with overwhelming patronage from
micronance banks, mostly targeting small and
medium farmers. On the other hand, immediately
following the 2007-08 global nancial crisis and the
subsequent credit squeeze, the Bank introduced the
Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme (CACS) in
2009 to fast-track development of the agricultural
sector through credit for commercial agriculture at
single digit interest rate, enhance national food
security through increased food supply and
engender lower agricultural output prices and low
food ination, among other objectives (CBN, 2017).
This was routinely followed in 2010 by the Power and
Airline Intervention Fund (PAIF) and the Small and
Medium Enterprises Re-nancing and Restructuring
Facility (SMERRF) which were to serve as credit
enhancement instruments to improve the nancial
position of banks in view of the global nancial crisis.

2.4.1

Small and Medium Enterprises Re-nancing and
Restructuring Facility (SMERRF);
Presidential Fertiliser Initiative (PFI);
CBN-BOI Industrial Facility (CBIF); and
Textile Sector Intervention Facility (TSIF).

3.0

Methodology

3.1

Data

Data on the cumulative disbursements to MSMEs and
large enterprises from the interventions was obtained
from the Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report
2018.

Industrial Sector Interventions

These are overwhelmingly targeted at
manufacturing. They include:
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of these assumptions. The model is of the form:

Analytical Framework

k

The analytical framework adopted inferential
methods. Analysis was to proceed in three or four
steps, depending on the third step:

F * = MSS
=
MSS

(i) Test for normality (normal distribution of residuals),
using Jarque-Bera Test;

Where:

ån (X
j

B
W

j

- X )-2 (k 1)

i =1
k nk

.
2

åå ( X - X )j

j

.

.

.

(3)

(N k )

1

(ii) Test for equality of variances or homogeneity
between the intervention intensities of the sectors,
using Bartlett, Levene or Brown-Forsythe Tests;

*F

= Value by which the statistical
signicance of the mean differences
is judged.

(iii) Conduct parametric test (ANOVA) or nonparametric test (Kruskal-Wallis H), for differences in
means or medians between the intervention
intensities of the sectors; and

MSSB

= Mean sum of squares of treatment
or sum of squared deviations
between the mean intervention
intensity of each sample and the
overall or grand mean intervention
intensity, divided by the number of
independent groups less one.

MSSW

= Mean sum of squares of error or sum
of squared deviations within, that is,
sum of squared deviations of each
intervention intensity from the mean
intervention intensity of its sector or
group, divided by the overall number
of observations less the number of
independent groups.

nj

= Sample size in jth group or sector,
where j =agr, ind, srv, and mlt, and the
nagr ,
respective sample sizes are agrn,
nmlt .
n
ind , srvn
nsrv and mltn.
indn,

Xj

= Sample mean of/ in the jth group or
sector.

X

= Total, overall or grand mean of
intervention intensity.

X

= intervention intensity in/ for each
intervention.

k

= Number of independent or
comparison groups, in this case the 4
sectors.

N

= Total sample size or number of
observations in the analysis.

(iv) Conduct post-hoc tests to determine the specic
sectors that are different if the means or medians are
indeed unequal, or terminate analysis in (iii) if
otherwise. Post-hoc tests include (i) Tukey HSD (ii)
Dunnett and (iii) Hsu's MCB, for ANOVA, or (i) Conover
(ii) Dunn and (ii) Nemenyi methods, for Kruskal-Wallis
(Frost, 2019).
The analytical procedure leans heavily on some
assumptions about the inferential methods. These
Include: independence of observations, i.e.
individual interventions are drawn randomly and
independently of each other; equality of group/
sector variances or homoscedasticity/ homogeneity
of sectoral intervention intensities, at = 0.05; group/
sector samples are drawn from normally distributed
populations, that is, normality tested at = 0.05; and
independent group samples, i.e. groups/ sectors are
drawn independently of each other. When these
assumptions hold true, the parametric test is used, in
this case, analysis of variance (ANOVA). When the
assumptions are argely violated, the non-parametric
Kruskal-Wallis test is used (see Zaiontz, 2019).
The study utilised the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
model to test the null hypothesis of no difference in
the intensity of intervention by the CBN among the
sectors of the economy over time, against the
alternative that there is. Interpretively, the null stated
that the CBN is not conducting sector-preferential
development nance, while the alternative stated
that it is. That is, if the population mean intensity of
intervention under each group/ in each sector, also
msrv and mltm
mmlt
m agr , indm,
mind , srvm
known as the group mean, is agrm,
for agriculture, industry, services and multi-sector,
respectively, the null hypothesis (H0) is presented as:
H0: magr = mind = msrv = mmlt .
.
.
.
.
(1)
The alternative hypothesis (HA) states that at least a
pair of the means is not equal. That is,
HA: magr ¹ mind or magr ¹ msrv or magr ¹ mmlt or mind ¹ m srv or mind ¹ mmltd or msrv ¹ mmlt (2)

ANOVA is fairly robust, implying that test results remain
valid to a certain extent in the face of mild violations
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The F statistic is evaluated at a = 0.05, at two degrees
of freedom (df): the numerator df, df1 = k-1 and the
denominator df, df2 = N-k. If the variability of the
group/ sector means around the total mean (MSSB) is
less than the variability of each group/ sector around
its mean (MSSB), the F statistic is small and the null
hypothesis is true. If, however, it is large, the null
hypothesis is false, and will be rejected. Conclusively,
if the null hypothesis is true, and so the population
means m for the k groups are equal, any variation of
the group means around the total mean is due to
chance and can, therefore, be considered error
(Zaiontz, 2019; Sullivan, 2019; Statistics Solution, 2013).
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On the other hand, the Kruskal-Wallis H test is the nonparametric alternative to the one-way ANOVA
because there are no assumptions about the
distribution of the data. It is used when the
assumptions of ANOVA are not met. That is, the H test
relaxes the assumptions such as normality and
homogeneity, among others. Since it uses the ranks of
the data values rather than the actual data for the
test, it is often called ANOVA on ranks, while the null
and the alternative hypotheses are given as:

Table II: CBN's intervention intensity by sector

H0: the group population medians are equal .

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report 2018

Panel A – the interventions
AGR
IND
SRV
MLT
ABP
SMERRF
NEMSF
NESF
CACS
PFI
PAIF
EDF
PAS
TSIF
NBET-PAF MSMEDF
AADS
CBIF
SANEF
NFSP
ACGS
RSSF
IDP
DCRR
AGSMEIS
SMECGS

. (4)

HA: the group population medians are not equal . .(5)

In induced funding interventions, nancing arises
from the direct policy actions of the Bank. These are
sub-divided into two types, namely the credit
guarantee schemes and the interventions involving
mobilisation of banking system resources. For the
credit guarantee interventions, that is, ACGS and
SMECGS, the guarantee policy instrument covers 75
per cent and 80 per cent of principal and interest,
respectively. Hence, these respective proportions of
total disbursements were assumed to directly evince
the faith of nancial institutions in the guarantee and,
therefore, applied for purpose of this study, e.g. for
ACGS, N85.68 billion represents 75 per cent of
cumulative nancing from inception, and is assumed
to reect the portion of credit granted as a result of
the existence of the guarantee.

The H statistic is given as:

Where:
H
= Value by which the statistical signicance of
the median differences was judged.
nj

= Sample size of the jth group or sector.

k

= Number of groups, samples or sectors.

Rj

= Sum of ranks in/ of the jth group or sector.

N

= Total sample size or number of observations
in the analysis.

The second sub-group consists of interventions under
which the CBN has no nancial burden, namely
AGSMEIS and DCRR. However, it played signicant
roles in mobilising and channelling the resources of
the banking system to MSME nancing. Accordingly,
it used moral suasion and its afliation, as Head of the
Bankers' Committee, in the case of AGSMEIS. It also
deployed nancial regulation to implement a
differentiated dynamic cash reserves requirement, in
the case of DCRR (CBN, 2018b).

The H statistic is evaluated at aa = 0.05, at k-1 df. If the
test statistic is less than the critical value, the null
hypothesis of no difference between the population
medians is true. Contrarily, if the test statistic is more
than the critical chi-square value, the null hypothesis
is rejected as the evidence suggests inequality of
means (Zaiontz, 2019; Statistics Solution, 2013).
4.0

Panel B – the intervention
intensities (₦ bn)
Agr
Ind
Srv
Mlt
174.48 300.0 183.09
25.4
603.29 30.0 301.37
10.18
44.4
55.77 534.18
83.36
0
100.0
5.5
38.96
85.68
115.51
3.11
6.16
0.42
3.4

Results and Discussion

Table II shows data used in the analyses. Panel A
shows the sectors included in the sector samples while
Panel B shows the corresponding intervention
intensities. The intervention intensity is dened as the
totality of nancing from the CBN, comprising direct
funding interventions and induced funding
interventions. In the direct funding interventions, the
Bank provides PFIs with funds for on-lending at
approved lending rate and tenor. The gures refer to
the cumulative disbursements in such interventions,
e.g. N174.48 billion for ABP.

4.1

Test for normality

As can be seen in Table III, the small values of the
Jarque-Bera statistics indicate that the standardised
residuals of all samples are normally distributed. This is
so because the associated probability values ranged
from approximately 0.31 for agriculture to 0.88 for
services, which are all higher than aa = 0.05.
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Table III: Test for normality
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

AGR
151.8267
65.04000
603.2900
0.000000
230.3980
1.499560
3.638148

IND
121.4425
77.88500
300.0000
30.00000
122.4978
0.970579
2.181530

SER
256.0350
242.2300
534.1800
5.500000
221.7421
0.194096
1.830545

MLT
35.42375
17.79000
115.5100
0.420000
42.37430
1.015582
2.538011

Jarque-Bera
Probability
Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.
Observations

2.350490
0.308743
910.9600
265416.2
6

0.739664
0.690850
485.7700
45017.17
4

0.253053
0.881151
1024.140
147508.7
4

1.446354
0.485208
283.3900
12569.07
8

divergent outcomes of the homogeneity tests to
provide reasonable room for trustworthy inference.
Additionally, the outcome of the earlier conducted
normality test supported the use of ANOVA. Recall
that ANOVA was said to be fairly robust to mild
violations of its assumptions, such as that emerging
from this test.
4.3

ANOVA test results are presented in Table V which
showed that there was no difference between the
mean intervention intensity of the sectors by the CBN.
The probability a = 0.19 was more than the a = 0.05,
with the associated test statistic equal to 1.74, which
is quite low.

Source: Author's computation using Eviews 7.0.

Moreover, agriculture had the largest mean of 151.83,
while the multi-sector had the least, at 35.42. Services
displayed the most symmetry, with 0.19, which
indicated that its sample was near normal, since a
normal distribution has 0 skewness. Multi-sector and
agriculture had kurtoses which were nearest to that of
a normal distribution (3), at 2.53 and 3.63,
respectively. On the whole, the result of the JarqueBera test suggested that all samples are normally
distributed, which makes further analysis with ANOVA
consistent.
4.2

Table V: ANOVA test for equality of means between
sectors
Method
ANOVA F-test
Welch F-test*
Analysis of Variance
Source of Variation
Between
Within
Total

Variable
AGR
IND
SER
MLT
All

Count
6
4
4
8
22

Value
Probability
13.53922
0.0036
2.459726
0.0959
1.337388
0.2935

Std. Dev.
230.3980
122.4978
221.7421
42.37430
170.1059

Mean Abs. Mean Abs.
Mean Diff. Median Diff.
158.0389
135.9900
89.27875
78.55750
161.7400
161.7400
32.88969
30.38375
100.7012
91.82727

df

Sum of Squares Mean Square
137145.5
45715.16
470511.1
26139.50
607656.5
28936.03

3
18
21

Note, also, that the Welch Test, a parametric
alternative to ANOVA which allows for unequal
variances as found in the data used herein, also
indicated that the null hypothesis of no difference in
the means cannot be rejected. From the foregoing,
there was no need for post-hoc test.
4.4

Kruskal-Wallis H Test

In Table VI, the Kruskal-Wallis H Test results similarly
indicated that the null hypothesis of homogeneity of
medians cannot be rejected, given the low test
statistic of 4.40 and the 0.22 probability, which is
above a = 0.05.

Table IV: Test for equality of variances of sectors
3
(3, 18)
(3, 18)

Value
Probability
1.748891
0.1930
1.881916
0.2315

Source: Author's computation using Eviews 7.0.

The test for homogeneity of variance gave mixed
results (Table IV), while the Bartlett Method indicated
that the variances were not equal (a = 0.0036 which
was less than a = 0.05), a violation of the ANOVA
assumption of equality of variances. However, both
the Levene and the Brown-Forsythe Methods did not
reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that the
variances were equal.

df

df
(3, 18)
(3, 6.15214)

*Test allows for unequal cell variances

Test for Homogeneity of Variance

Method
Bartlett
Levene
Brown-Forsythe
Category Statistics

Test of ANOVA

Table VI: Kruskal-Wallis test for equality of medians
between sectors
Method
Med. Chi-square
Adj. Med. Chi-square
Kruskal-Wallis
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.)
van der Waerden
Category Statistics

df
3
3
3
3
3

Value Probability
4.000000
0.2615
1.791667
0.6168
4.409091
0.2205
4.409091
0.2205
4.028200
0.2584
> Overall

Bartlett weighted standard deviation: 161.6772
Source: Author's computation using Eviews 7.0.

Variable
AGR
IND
SER
MLT
All

In the absence of unanimity of outcomes from this
test, analysis proceeded with both ANOVA and
Kruskal-Wallis Tests. Simultaneously conducting the
parametric and non-parametric tests served to
capitalise the benet of doubt afforded by the

Count
6
4
4
8
22

Median
Median
65.04000
3
77.88500
3
242.2300
3
17.79000
2
50.08500
11

Source: Author's computation using Eviews 7.0.
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Mean
Mean
Rank
Score
11.33333 -0.043712
13.75000 0.277152
16.00000 0.621019
8.250000 -0.416302
11.50000 -2.02E-17
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Other non-parametric tests, including the van der
Waerden Method, also suggested that the null
hypothesis was true. In view of this, no post-hoc test
was conducted.
4.5

market-driven intervention policy now, with no
directives to banks to maintain credit oors and
ceilings or to lend at regulated interest rates. Rather,
indirect approaches such as credit guarantees, expost interest rebates, low-cost and long-term funding
to nancial institutions, are being used by the Bank to
deepen the nancial market and provide diverse
investment options for banks. In the same vein,
interest saved by MSMEs that have accessed the
interventions is an additional source of real and
nancial investments in the economy.

Policy Implications

Several implications emanate from these ndings.
Firstly, the CBN is pursuing a holistic development
nance practice. That is, there is no preferential policy
towards a single sector or group of sectors as all
sectors are viewed as priority for development. This
approach of simultaneous and uniform development
of all sectors shows that the Bank is neither unmindful
of nor unresponsive to current economic realities. For
instance, the services sector has since overtaken
agriculture as the dominant sector, and it would
seem untenable to deny it its fair share of nancing.
Similarly, agriculture has been driving growth and was
partly responsible for recent economic recovery. This
justies the sustained intervention in the sector.

Since the sectoral intervention intensities are normally
distributed, we can reasonably expect that the
intensity of each intervention will most likely be close
to the mean sectoral intervention intensity.
Furthermore, as the interventions are mostly
enterprise size-specic (targeting one of micro, small
and medium, or large enterprises), it implies that
each intervention contributed almost equally to the
sectoral intervention intensity. In other words, there is
a lower probability of dominance of one intervention
within each sectoral basket as well. This is particularly
illuminating because of the higher credit risk and
higher transaction costs often associated with
MSMEs, compared with large corporations, and
which would have made the latter to have a highlyskewed chance of being nanced. But, CBN's
development nance intervention practice appears
to have addressed the disparity or discrimination, by
providing equal opportunity for enterprises,
irrespective of size, to derive benets from its
interventions.

Secondly, there is the conrmation that the
promotion of economic diversication is a major
policy thrust of the Bank's development nance
strategy. Intervening in as many sectors as possible
within the broader non-oil sector classication reects
a deliberate and guided approach to growth, which
should help quicken the pace of overall economic
development.
Thirdly, the Bank pursues a high level of economic
inclusiveness/ inclusive growth. By throwing a wide
net of interventions to cover many sectors, it
engenders wider income distribution through job
creation and poverty alleviation. It also has the
additional benet of bringing more economic units
under the inuence of monetary and interest rate
policies, thereby eliciting greater responsiveness to,
and effectiveness of, both.

5.0

Conclusion and Recommendations

An evaluation of the development nance strategy
of the CBN has shown that there is no dominant or
preferred sector of intervention by the Bank, despite
agriculture and manufacturing being the most
frequently referenced sector and sub-sector with
respect to the Bank's interventions. The parametric
ANOVA and the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis Tests
did not reject the null hypotheses of equality of
means and medians, respectively, between the
intervention intensity of the Bank in relevant sectors of
the economy. The implications are that
development nance strategy is holistic, inclusive
and are geared towards economic diversication
and uniform development, among others.

Fourthly, since no sector is preferentially treated,
there is no sectoral dominance. This implies that
irrespective of the chosen sector of investment or
operation by an enterprise, there is statistically an
equal opportunity of accessing any of the Bank's
interventions which have more favourable terms,
compared with own balance sheet lending by banks,
including low interest and long tenors, among others.
This should encourage investors and entrepreneurs to
venture into more diverse and potentially lucrative
endeavours since such activities stand an equal
chance of attracting intervention nance like the
often referenced activities of agriculture and
manufacturing.

It is recommended that the Bank should sustain the
implementation of the interventions. Although
intervention impacts or policy effectiveness could be
the subject of other studies, the intensity of
intervention suggests that the interventions are
promoting the policy thrusts of economic
diversication and inclusiveness. Implementation
should also continue to be guided by successful

Fifthly, there is reassurance that the CBN had,
denitely, discontinued the preferred sector policy.
More pragmatically, it is sustaining a relatively
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principles which have eliminated disparity in
nancing between MSMEs and large enterprises.
Besides, the bank should consider increasing the
focus of its interventions on education sector and
mining & quarrying sub-sector. From Table I, we noted
that both had not only attracted the lowest shares of
banks' credit in recent times, at 0.1 per cent and 0.5
per cent, respectively, but also had negative credit
growth of -10.1 per cent and -6.5 per cent
respectively. Education is crucial for human capital
development while mining & quarrying, which used
to employ the largest proportion of labour after
agriculture, has since paled into insignicance,
although with huge potentials to drive growth.
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